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RECENT DECISIONS
OF JUNE 5, 1920, c. 250, Sec. 20;
ACT) 41 Stat. 988, 1007-FELLOW SERVANT RULE-This is an
action brought in a State Court seeking a common law remedy for
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff (Haverty) upon a vessel
at dock in the harbor of Seattle. The plaintiff was a longshoreman
engaged in stowing freight in the hold. Through the negligence
of the hatch tender no warning was given that a load of freight
was about to be lowered, and when the load came down, the plaintiff
was badly hurt. The plaintiff and hatch tender both were employed by
the defendant stevedore and the defendant asked for a ruling that they
were fellow servants and that therefore the plaintiff could not recover.
The court ruled that if the failure of the hatch tender to give the signal
was the proximate cause of the injury, the verdict must be for the
plaintiff. Verdict found for the plaintiff. Affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the State. Held, for plaintiff, by the Act of June 5, 1920, c.
250, Sec. 20 (Jones Act), 41 Stat. 988, 1007, Congress meant by the use
of the word "seaman" to include stevedores engaged as the plaintiff was,
whatever it might mean in laws of a different kind, and that in such actions all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law remedy in case of personal injuries to railway employees shall
apply. The statutes referred to do away with the fellow servant rule in
the case of personal injuries to railway employees and therefore it
can be no defense in the present action. International Stevedoring
Company v. Haverty, U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. T. 1926, No. 236.
The courts have been quite liberal in deciding who is a "seaman" in
the modern sense. In Saylor v. Taylor, 77 Fed. 476, 479, (C. C. A. 4th,
1896), it was stated, "Hence it is that in all times and in all countries
those who are employed upon a vessel in any capacity, however humble,
and whose labor contributes in any degree, however slight, to the accomplishment of the main object in which the vessel is engaged, are clothed
by the law with the legal rights of mariners, 'no matter what may -be
their sex, character, station or profession. Ben. Adm. s. 241.'" So it
has been held that, as a dredge has been considered a ship, so the men
who operate it are held to be seamen. Saylor v. Taylor, supra; Ellis
v. U. S., 206 U. S. 246 (11 Ann. Cas. 589, 1907). Fishermen and
sealers, who go for that purpose are held to be seamen, though they
may do other incidental work. The Minna, 11 Fed. 759 (E. D. Mich.
1882); Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 Fed. 99, (C. C. A. 9th,
1902); North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Larsen, 220 Fed. 93, (C. C. A. 9th,
1915). The wife of a ship's cook who has been engaged as a second
cook by the master, is a mariner in this sense. James H. Shirgley, 50
Fed. 287 (N. D. N. Y. 1892). So too, a clerk of a steamboat. Sultana,
1 Brown, Adm. 13, Fed. Cas. No. 13602 (1857). So too, a bartender,
J. S. Warden, 175 Fed. 315 (S. D. N. Y. 1910). So too, the ship's
steward. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Schmidt, 214 Fed. 513, (C. C. A.
9th, 1914). And the wireless operator. Buena Vientura, 243 Fed. 797,
(S. D. N. Y. 1916). But it never has been held prior to the principal
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case that an independent contractor or his employees were seamen.
The Hoquiam, 253 Fed. 627 (C. C. A. 9th 1918); Johnson v. American
Hawaiian S. S. Co. 14 Fed. (2nd) 534 (1926).
This decision brings about a drastic change in the law regarding
maritime torts. The former rule was that by the general maritime law
the vessel owner was liable only for the maintenance, cure and wages of
a seaman injured by the negligence of a fellow servant. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v. Luckenbach
Steamship Co., Inc., 247 U. S. 372 (1918).
The Jones Act of June 5, 1920, changed the rule so far as seamen
were concerned and allowed them to recover compensatory damages.
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924); The Osceola,
189 U. S. 158 (1903); The Iroquois, 194 U. S. 240 (1904); Chelentis
v. Luchenbach Steamship Co., supra.
Stevedores or longshoremen could not, before the principal case,
hold their employers responsible if the negligent act which caused his
injuries was that of a fellow servant. Cassil v. United States Emergency Fleet Corporation, 289 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 9th 1923) ; The Hoquiam,
supra; The Daisy, 282 Fed. 261 (C. C. A. 9th 1922) ; Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921); Carstensen v. Hammond Lumber Co.,
11 Fed. (2nd) 142 (C. C. A. 9th 1926).
In The Hoquiam, supra, in a very able opinion by Hunt, C.J., it
was said, "when we consider that the only class of persons mentioned
in the section (Sec. 20-Act of June 5, 1920) are seamen, it is proper
to read and understand the whole section by its ordinary grammatical
sense. The great purpose, the special need for protection of seamen,
was carried out by the statute; but we find no safe ground for extension
of its provisions to others not seamen." This seems to express the true
intent of the statute, even in view of what the Supreme Court has laid
down in the principal case. It is manifestly unsound to construe the
"Jones Act" as applying to stevedores and longshoremen. The whole
tenor of the Act is for the protection of seamen and has no reference in
any of its provisions to other maritime employments. It is submitted
that if Congress intended to include other employments, it would not
have restricted its language to "seamen."
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DAMAGES.-This is an action by the plaintiffs to recover substantial
damages for a breach of the defendant's covenant against incumbrances. The plaintiffs allege that the land in question was sold to
them by the defendant with a full covenant and warranty deed, but
that in fact, at the time of conveyance, there was an outstanding
mortgage on the premises. It appears that the mortgage was thereafter satisfied of record by the defendant. Plaintiffs appeal from a
judgment awarding them nominal damages. Held, judgment of nominal damages affirmed by a unanimous opinion on the ground that in
a breach of a covenant against incumbrances the plaintiff may recover
nominal damages only, unless lie alleges and proves same special damage. McShane v. Kilpatrick, 110 So. 281 (Sup. Ct. Ala., 1926).

